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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to review the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the United States and 
against Harry Grant and Sandalwood Corporation. The 
court ruled that Grant and Sandalwood were liable for 
violations of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. S 7401 et seq., 
("CAA"), and the National Emission Standard for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants established for asbestos, 40 C.F.R. pt. 61, 
subpt. M. ("NESHAP"), as a matter of law, and assessed 
penalties against Grant and Sandalwood in the amount of 
$2,975,000 under 42 U.S.C. S 7413(b). That sum represents 
the maximum fine for each violation for each day the 
violation existed. 
 
We will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the United States based upon Grant's and Sandalwood's 
non-compliance with an EPA compliance order for each day 
they were "operators" beginning on June 29, 1988. 
However, since we conclude that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the three visible emissions that were 
charged, we will vacate that portion of the district court's 
order that is based upon those three violations, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. We also conclude that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Grant and Sandalwood 
functioned as operators under the CAA until September 14, 
1988. Finally, we hold that the district court erred in 
calculating the fine Grant and Sandalwood must pay. 
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Therefore, on remand, the United States must establish the 
number of days that Grant and Sandalwood functioned as 
operators, and the district court will recalculate penalties 




This matter concerns approximately sixty-five acres of 
waterfront property located at 1301 Hudson Street, 
Hoboken, New Jersey ("Hoboken property"). It is undisputed 
that Anthony Dell'Aquilla is the owner of this property. On 
May 5, 1988, Dell'Aquilla and Grant entered into an 
Agreement to Form Joint Venture ("Agreement") to develop 
the Hoboken property. Under the terms of the Agreement, 
Grant would become the project manager in charge of the 
"overall management and control of the business and 
affairs of the venture." App. at 280. The Agreement outlined 
the responsibilities and representations relevant to the 
environmental condition of the property. It provided that, in 
the event that any hazardous environmental condition was 
discovered on the property, Dell'Aquilla would cure the 
condition at his own expense and indemnify Grant against 
any and all "damages, remedial orders, judgments or 
decrees, and all costs and expenses related thereto." App. 
at 277. According to Grant, Dell'Aquilla also provided him 
with copies of correspondence from contractors certifying 
that the property and buildings on the property had been 
inspected and were free of asbestos. Id. at 539. The 
Agreement further provided that Grant would receive a joint 
ownership interest in the property contingent upon 
refinancing. However, the refinancing was neverfinalized, 
and Grant also learned that Dell'Aquilla could not convey 
clear title so Grant never obtained an ownership interest 
under the Agreement. 
 
Grant invested time and money developing the Hoboken 
property in his role as project manager. He and his wife 
were the majority shareholders in Sandalwood. 
Sandalwood's responsibilities included hiring engineers and 
architects to develop the Hoboken property, and contracting 
for the demolition of the buildings already on the property 
and removal of the resulting debris. Id. at 164 & 229. Grant 
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also incorporated Grant Marina Urban Renewal Corporation 
to participate in the development. 
 
The development of the property began on June 10, 
1988, with the demolition of existing buildings. On June 
17, 1988, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sent 
inspectors Robert Fitzpatrick and Jose Rodriguez to the 
property because the EPA had not been notified of the 
demolition as required by law. App. at 483. While there, 
Inspector Fitzpatrick observed insulation that appeared to 
be asbestos containing material ("ACM") covering several 
pipes in one of the demolished buildings. He also noticed 
that the debris from the demolition appeared to contain 
ACM. Id. at 21-22. His observations were corroborated 
when subsequent tests performed upon samples taken from 
the area established they contained asbestos. 
 
Fitzpatrick returned to the Hoboken property several 
times during the summer of 1988. During these visits, he 
witnessed numerous violations of state and federal 
environmental laws. The violations included the continued 
unauthorized demolition of ACM structures, visible 
emissions of ACM dust, improper removal of ACM, and 
inadequate wetting of the ACM which allowed particles to 
become airborne. On June 29, 1988, the EPA issued a 
compliance order under S 112 of the CAA in which it 
commanded Dell'Aquilla, Grant and Sandalwood to comply 
with all federal asbestos regulations. However, despite the 
notice, the parties continued the demolition in the same 
manner that had given rise to the EPA notification. 
 
On July 22, 1988, the government filed a complaint 
against Dell'Aquilla, Grant and Sandalwood alleging a total 
of 119 violations of asbestos-related regulations, and 
seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties under the CAA 
and NESHAP. Dell'Aquilla settled with the government and 
agreed to pay a disclosed amount in fines ($400,000). The 
government then moved for summary judgment against 
Grant and Sandalwood. Grant and Sandalwood did not 
dispute the violations except for allegations that visible 
emissions of asbestos occurred on three dates (June 27, 
July 7, and July 13, 1988). However, Grant and 
Sandalwood argued that they were not liable under the 
regulations because they were not "owners or operators" of 
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the Hoboken property. See 40 C.F.R. S 61.02. The district 
court held that they were "operators", and found them in 
violation of the regulations.1 
 
The court imposed the statutory maximum penalty of 
$25,000 per day for each violation for a total fine of 
$2,975,000. Grant and Sandalwood filed a motion to 
amend and alter the judgment seeking to reverse the 
penalty amount. However, the court refused to reconsider 
the amount of the penalty because it concluded that Grant 
had initially failed to submit evidence of his finances. This 
appeal followed. 
 
Grant and Sandalwood argue that: (1) there are genuine 
issues of material fact concerning their status as "owners or 
operators" of the Hoboken property, (2) the government 
failed to make a prima facie case for each of the 119 
violations alleged, and (3) the district court abused its 
discretion in failing to reconsider the $2,975,000 penalty in 
light of Grant's financial situation. We have jurisdiction 




The CAA was enacted, in part, "to protect and enhance 
the quality of the Nation's air resources." 42 U.S.C. 
S 7401(b)(1). In order to meet this objective, Congress 
authorized the EPA to establish emission standards for 
enumerated hazardous air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court also denied the government's request for injunctive 
relief because it concluded that the government had not established that 
Grant and Sandalwood were currently engaged in or planned to engage 
in activities which would lead to further violations. D. Ct. Op. at 20. 
 
2. We exercise plenary review. Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 745 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when the 
pleadings and other submissions show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also, Bank of Nova Scotia v. 
Equitable Fin. Management, Inc., 882 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1989). The 
"mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will 
not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary 
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material 
fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). 
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S 7412(d)(1995). The asbestos standards, at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
61, subpt. M, establish mandatory standards for the 
renovation and demolition of a facility that contains 
asbestos, and for the disposal of asbestos. A violation of 
this NESHAP constitutes a violation of the CAA. See 42 
U.S.C. S 7412. 
 
A. Liability as Operator 
 
The CAA imposes strict liability upon owners and 
operators who violate the Act. See United States v. B & W 
Inv. Properties, 38 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1994). Therefore, 
although Grant and Sandalwood argue that Dell'Aquilla 
and/or his agents led them to believe that any asbestos on 
the property had properly been removed and all necessary 
permits had been obtained, see Appellants' Br. at 8-10, 
those assertions are not relevant to our analysis, and we 
need not respond. 
 
The CAA defines an "owner or operator" as "any person 
who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises a 
stationary source." 40 C.F.R. 61.02. A stationary source is 
"any structure, facility, or installation which emits any air 
pollutant which has been designated as hazardous by the 
Administrator." Id. Grant and Sandalwood concede that the 
property is a "stationary source" and only challenge their 
status as "owners or operators" of the property. 
 
It is clear that neither Grant nor Sandalwood were 
owners of the Hoboken property. Under the Agreement, 
Grant's procurement of refinancing for the property was a 
condition precedent to the fruition of his ownership 
interest. In addition, as mentioned above, the contemplated 
conveyance of an ownership interest under the Agreement 
never occurred because Dell'Aquilla could not convey clear 
title. Accordingly, Dell'Aquilla remained the sole owner of 
the property. However, it is now axiomatic that a non-owner 
can still be liable as an "operator." Moreover, our 
determination of whether one is an operator or owner under 
the CAA must be conducted in a manner consistent with 
the broad reach of the statute. See, e.g., United States v. 
Tzavah Urban Renewal Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1013, 1021 (D. 
N.J. 1988) (" `[O]wner or operator' is defined broadly for 
purposes of asbestos regulations."). 
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Here, the district court relied in part upon United States 
v. Walsh, 783 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.Wash. 1991), aff'd, 8 F.3d 
1013 (9th Cir. 1993), to conclude that Grant and 
Sandalwood were not shielded from liability merely because 
they never acquired legal title. In Walsh, the court opined 
that a person is strictly liable under the CAA if he or she 
had "significant or substantial or real control and 
supervision over a project." Id. at 548. Although we are not 
bound by the holding in Walsh, we agree with the district 
court that the analysis in Walsh is correct. 
 
The control and supervision that Grant and Sandalwood 
exercised over the project was more than sufficient to 
support the district court's conclusion that they were 
operators under the CAA. For instance, Grant negotiated 
the contracts for the demolition work that was done on the 
project. App. at 183-85. During his deposition, Grant 
described his role in the project as follows: "I met the 
[contractors], I review which price is better. We discussed 
with our people which [sic] better to hire, et cetera, et 
cetera." Id. at 184. See Tzavah Urban Renewal Corp., 696 
F. Supp. at 1021 (finding that defendants who were 
charged with hiring and firing contractors were "operators" 
under the CAA). Grant signed the demolition contracts on 
behalf of Sandalwood and Grant Marina. The contractors 
he retained were involved with all aspects of the project 
from demolition to asbestos clean-up. In addition, Grant 
was regularly on the property and witnessed the demolition 
of several of the asbestos-infested buildings. App. at 244. 
 
Grant argues that much of what he said during his 
deposition should have been disregarded because he does 
not have a strong command of the English language. 
However, the district court properly rejected that assertion. 
Grant was represented by counsel during all phases of 
these proceedings. Moreover, he had a sufficient command 
of English to enter into an intricate agreement with 
Dell'Aquilla, incorporate two companies, and negotiate 
construction contracts as well as contracts with engineers 
and architects. 
 
Grant clearly possessed "significant or substantial or real 
control and supervision" and was therefore an "operator" 
within the meaning of the CAA. Walsh, 783 F. Supp. at 
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548. Even though his formal role as owner or project 
manager never materialized, he clearly functioned in that 
capacity as evidenced by the control he exercised over the 
project. Therefore, the district court properly concluded 
that he was the functional equivalent of an "owner" or 
"manager." 
 
Sandalwood attempts to evade liability by shifting 
responsibility to Grant Marina. Sandalwood argues that 
even if Grant was an operator of the property, Sandalwood 
was not an operator because Grant Marina was specifically 
created to participate in the Hoboken development.3 The 
precise point at which Grant Marina began to exercise 
responsibility over the property is unclear. However, it is 
clear that Sandalwood was in existence prior to Grant 
Marina and was active in the daily operations of the 
property. Grant stated that Sandalwood's responsibilities in 
the project included: "hir[ing] attorney[s], engineer[s], 
architect[s] or anything like that to work on the site." App. 
at 163. There is also uncontradicted evidence that 
Sandalwood continued to be involved in the project after 
the issuance of the compliance order on June 29, 1988. For 
example, a check dated July 11, 1988, in the amount of 
$25,000 payable to cash was signed by Sandalwood, and 
the checkbook register indicates that the proceeds of that 
check were intended for one of the contractors. App. at 256. 
The record also contains a letter dated July 28, 1988, from 
Sandalwood to L. Corio & Sons, Inc. The letter states, in 
part, that: "[t]his letter constitutes a modification of the 
contract between Sandalwood Construction Corp., 
contractor, and L. Corio and Sons, Inc., sub-contractor, for 
demolition work at [the Hoboken property]." This letter was 
signed by Sandalwood, and there is no reference 
whatsoever to Grant Marina. Id. at 415. Sandalwood clearly 
exercised sufficient control over the development of the 
property to qualify as an "operator." See generally, B & W 
Inv. Properties, 38 F.3d at 367 ("B & W exercised control 
over the parcel sufficient to bring [it] within the scope of 
`owner or operator' designation because its name appeared 
on court papers and on a contract with an asbestos clean- 
up company."). Thus, the district court correctly concluded 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Grant Marina was not a named party in this action. 
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that there were no genuine questions of material fact as to 
the operator status of either Grant or Sandalwood. 
 
The 119 charged violations include a violation for each of 
the sixty-seven days of non-compliance from June 29, 
1988, until the Agreement was terminated on September 
14, 1988. Grant testified at his deposition that, to the best 
of his knowledge, he visited the site each day from the 
beginning of the demolition until the demolition was 
completed; however, the record is unclear as to when 
demolition was completed. Although it may have continued 
until September 14, 1988, there is nothing to establish that 
its duration was coterminous with the Agreement. 
Similarly, although Sandalwood clearly functioned as an 
operator, this record also fails to establish how long 
Sandalwood acted in that capacity. 
 
In United States v. Bestfoods, ___ S. Ct. ___, 1998 WL 
292076*7 (1998), the Supreme Court stated: 
 
       under CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who 
       directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the 
       affairs of a facility. To sharpen the definition[of 
       operator] for purposes of CERCLA's concern with 
       environmental contamination, an operator must 
       manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically 
       related to pollution, that is, operations having to do 
       with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or 
       decisions about compliance with environmental 
       regulations. 
 
Although the Court was there addressing the definition of 
"operator" in CERCLA, and not the CAA, the purposes of 
the two statutes is the same, and the language in question 
is nearly identical. Accordingly, the Court's gloss on the 
CERCLA definition is relevant to our inquiry. Grant and 
Sandalwood were clearly involved with contracts relating 
directly to the polluting activity beginning with the first 
notice on June 29, 1988. However, that does not mean that 
either or both continued to function in that capacity until 
the Agreement terminated.4 Thus, we conclude that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In United States v. Bestfoods, et al., S. Ct., 1998 WL 292076 (1998), 
the Supreme Court analyzed the liability of a parent corporation for a 
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district court erred in assuming that Grant and 
Sandalwood could be held liable for each violation for every 
day until September 14, 1988. 
 
Grant and Sandalwood also challenge six violations of 40 
C.F.R. S 61.146 concerning notice to the EPA based upon 
their assertion that they were not "owners or operators" of 
the Hoboken property. As discussed above, we find they 
were operators; accordingly, this challenge is without merit. 




On appeal, Grant and Sandalwood attempt to argue that 
the government did not present a prima facie case for 34 
demolition related NESHAP violations, and 18 disposal- 
related violations. See Appellants' Br. at 27-37, Points II & 
III. The government asserts that this attack has been 
waived, except insofar as appellants challenge violations for 
visible emissions related to disposal on June 27, July 7, 
and July 13, 1998. See Appellee's Br. at 19. Appellants' 
attempt to counter the government's assertion of waiver by 
arguing that they "maintained throughout their briefs below 
that the asbestos NESHAPs did not apply," and that their 
general assertion before the district court is sufficient to 
preserve the more specific argument raised here. Reply Br. 
at 6. 
 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals Local Appellate Rules 
require that each appellant's brief contain "a designation by 
reference to specific pages of the appendix or place in the 
proceedings at which each issue on appeal was raised, 
objected to, and ruled upon . . . ." 3d Cir. L.A.R. 23.1. 
Appellants' brief states that the insufficiency of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
subsidy under the analogous Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"). The Court held that 
a parent corporation can be liable "both directly, when the parent itself 
operates the facility, and indirectly, when the corporate veil can be 
pierced under state law." 1998 WL 292076 *4. Although we are not 
confronted with issues of separate corporate identity, we mention 
Bestfoods because it illustrates that the issue of Sandalwood's tenure as 
an operator is not as "clear cut" as the United States suggests. 
 
                                10 
 
 
government's prima facie case was raised at "Add-2, pp.3-4, 
14." See Appellants' Br. at 2. Those references are to the 
district court's opinion. At the relevant portions of those 
pages the district court stated that Grant and Sandalwood 
"do not contest" several of the government's allegations, see 
D. Ct. Op. at 4, "nor do the defendants deny the presence 
of ACM . . . [t]hus, the demolition of structures containing 
verified ACM and the witnessed emissions support the 
Court's conclusion that visible emissions of asbestos 
occurred on all of the days alleged." Id. at 14. The 
appellants' brief also states the following: "[o]n summary 
judgment below, the government incorrectly claimed that 
appellants were not challenging any of the alleged NESHAP 
violations other than the visible emissions. (CITE) That is 
incorrect." Appellants' Br. at 31. Appellants apparently had 
no more success finding a reference where the argument 
was preserved than we did as no "cite" is provided. 
Moreover, we have reviewed the Appendix submitted by the 
appellants in its entirety, and we do not find any assertion 
sufficient to preserve this issue on appeal. 
 
We have previously noted that, absent exceptional 
circumstances, an issue not raised in district court will not 
be heard on appeal. Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 
F.2d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 1992). "Exceptional circumstances 
have been recognized when the public interest requires that 
the issue[s] be heard or when a manifest injustice would 
result from the failure to consider the new issue[s]." Altman 
v. Altman, 653 F.2d 755, 758 (3d Cir. 1981) (citations 
omitted). We find no such exceptional circumstances here. 
Accordingly, appellants have waived much of their 
challenge to the sufficiency of the government's evidence to 
support the NESHAP violations. However, the government 
concedes that appellants did not waive their challenge to 
the three visible emissions of asbestos in violation of 40 
C.F.R. S 61.152(b). Accordingly, we turn our attention to 
those violations. 
 
C. Visible Emissions 
 
The district court held that the government had 
established that Inspector Fitzpatrick witnessed visible 
emissions on June 27, 1988, July 7, 1988, and July 13, 
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1988. The court cites "Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, 73-74, 77-79, 
89-90, 92-94" for that finding. D. Ct. Op. at 14. Neither 
appellants nor the government have included that exhibit in 
the Joint Appendix filed in this court. We have, however, 
reviewed Inspector Fitzpatrick's affidavit, and the portions 
of the transcript from his deposition that are included in 
the Joint Appendix. That evidence establishes that the 
inspector saw what he believed to be visible emissions of 
asbestos on June 27, 1988 (Fitzpatrick Aff. P 7), and July 
7, 1988 (Fitzpatrick Aff. P 11), but it does not mention 
witnessing any emissions on July 13, 1988 (Fitzpatrick Aff. 
P 12). App. at 22-23. Samples that the inspector took on 
June 27 and July 7 tested positive for asbestos. Although 
we find evidence of only two visible emissions, Grant and 
Sandalwood do not dispute that there were three. Rather, 
they contend that the government failed to establish as a 
matter of law that the three emissions were covered by 
NESHAP. We agree. 
 
Section 61.152(b) of the asbestos NESHAP states that 
each owner or operator of any source shall "[d]ischarge no 
visible emissions to the outside air during the collection, 
processing (including incineration), packaging, 
transporting, or disposition of any asbestos-containing 
waste material generated by the source." 40 C.F.R. 
S 61.149. "Visible emissions" are "any emissions containing 
particulate asbestos material that are visually detectable 
without the aid of instruments." 40 C.F.R. S 61.141 (1988).5 
Grant and Sandalwood argue that, even though the 
inspectors saw dust and debris, the government did not 
establish that the emissions contained asbestos, or even 
that they came from asbestos-infested buildings. 
Appellants' Br at 34. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The current regulations clarify this definition. "Visible emissions" is 
currently defined as "any emissions, which are visually detectable 
without the aid of instruments, coming from RACM or asbestos- 
containing waste material, or from any asbestos milling, manufacturing, 
or fabricating operation." 40 C.F.R. S 61.141 (1997). For purposes of this 
appeal, however, the more ambiguous definition found in the regulations 
that were in place at the time of the Hoboken property development is 
applicable. 
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The district court relied upon United States v. Midwest 
Suspension and Brake, 824 F. Supp. 713, 730 (E.D. Mich. 
1993), aff'd, 49 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1995), for support of its 
conclusion that summary judgment was warranted as to 
these visible emissions. In Midwest Suspension, the 
government had proven through circumstantial evidence 
that visible emissions, as defined under NESHAP, had been 
observed on three occasions. During the first occasion, an 
EPA inspector observed emissions while a dumpster was 
being unloaded at a landfill. Id. at 729. After this emission 
settled on top of a box, a sample was taken and that 
sample later tested positive for asbestos. On the second 
occasion, the government presented evidence that a sample 
of material that had been lying loose in a dumpster prior to 
transport tested positive for asbestos. An EPA inspector 
followed that dumpster as it was being transported and he 
observed a dust emission from the dumpster while it was 
being unloaded. Id. The court noted that although that dust 
was not tested, it could reasonably be inferred that the 
discharge came from the lose material that had been tested. 
The last visible emissions observed were discharged from a 
dumpster as it was being emptied in a landfill. The EPA 
inspector did not take samples of those emissions, but he 
testified that the emissions were "rust colored, which 
suggests that significant component of the emission was 
shot blast waste." Id. at 730. According to the inspector, 
this type of waste usually contains asbestos. Based on this 
evidence, the court concluded that the government had met 
its burden at trial. See also, United States v. Hugo Key and 
Son, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1135, 1271 (D. R.I. 1989) (finding 
a S 61.141 violation where evidence that friable asbestos 
material fell to the ground and remained there with no 
precautions to contain the material). 
 
Here, the inspector saw ACM in dry debris on the 
ground, app. at 22-23, and contractors loading demolition 
debris into dumpsters, id. at 23. The debris in the area was 
not wet down. id. Samples, which later tested positive for 
asbestos, were taken on June 27 and July 7. However, the 
samples that were taken were not samples of the "dust" 
from the emissions. Moreover, the government did not show 
the proximity of the visible emissions either to the area 
where the contractors were loading debris or to the area 
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where the asbestos-infested buildings were being 
demolished. Inspector Fitzpatrick also failed to describe the 
emissions as containing any specific type of "rust color" 
waste that may suggest the presence of asbestos. Moreover, 
unlike Midwest Suspension, there is no indication that the 
two positive test samples were taken from settled 
emissions. The evidence does not even establish that the 
samples were taken in the vicinity of the visual emissions. 
The inspector's affidavit is certainly consistent with a 
conclusion that the visible emissions contained asbestos. 
However, summary judgment requires more than a 
possibility or even a probability that it was asbestos. The 
government's proof must be sufficient to establish that fact 
as a matter of law. The proof here is too tenuous to pass 
that test. Moreover, we must draw all reasonable inferences 
in favor of Grant and Sandalwood, the nonmoving parties. 
Josey v John R. Hollingworth Corp. 996 F. 2d 632, 634 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
 
Accordingly, the government did not establish that the 
visible emissions contained asbestos, and summary 
judgment as to those violations was inappropriate. See 
generally, United States v. Owens Contracting Servs., Inc., 
884 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (concluding that there 
must be some proof that the visible emissions contained 
asbestos). 
 
III. Maximum Penalty 
 
42 U.S.C. S 7413(b) was amended in 1990 to read, in 
part, as follows: 
 
       The Administrator shall, as appropriate . . . commence 
       a civil action . . . to assess and recover a civil penalty 
       of not more than $25,000 per day for each violation. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 7413(b) (West 1995) (emphasis added). Prior to 
the 1990 Amendments, the CAA provided that the civil 
penalty would not exceed "$25,000 per day of violation." 42 
U.S.C. S 7413(b) (West 1988) (emphasis added). Thus, it is 
not clear whether the pre-Amendment maximum fine of 
$25,000 could be imposed on each violation for every day 
of the violation, or if it was to be limited by the number of 
days the owner/operator was in violation regardless of the 
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number of violations on a given day. However, the district 
court concluded that either version of the statute allowed it 
to impose the maximum fine for each violation, for each day 
the violation existed, and that the 1990 Amendments 
merely clarified that congressional intent. See D. Ct. Op. at 
15. That conclusion is not challenged on appeal.6 
Appellants do argue that the district court abused its 
discretion in determining the amount of the fine, but they 
do not challenge the court's interpretation of the statute. 
Since appellants do not challenge that ruling here, we will 
proceed on the assumption that the 1990 Amendments 
apply. We will limit our inquiry to whether the court abused 
its discretion in setting the amount of the fine at the 
statutory maximum. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 7413(e)(1) provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
       In determining the amount of any penalty to be 
       assessed . . . the administrator or the . . . court shall 
       take into consideration (in addition to such other 
       factors as justice may require) the size of the business, 
       the economic impact of the penalty on the business, 
       the violator's full compliance history and good faith 
       efforts to comply, the duration of the violation . .. 
       payment of the violator of penalties previously assessed 
       for the same violation, the economic benefit of the 
       noncompliance, and the seriousness of the violation.7 
 
(emphasis added). The total amount of the fines resulting 
from assessing $25,000 per day for each of 119 violations 
the court found from June 28, 1988 (the date of thefirst 
compliance order) to September 14, 1988 (the date the 
Agreement was terminated) was $2,975,000. The district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although we need not decide this issue in this appeal, we note that 
there is substantial precedent supporting the district court's 
interpretation. E.g. Midwest Suspension, 824 F. Supp. at 733-34; United 
States v. A.A. Mactal Constr. Co., 22 Envtl L Rep. 21200 (applying the 
1990 amended Act to violations that occurred in 1988 and 1989); 
Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128 
(11th Cir. 1990) (applying a similar provision in the Clean Water Act). 
 
7. The government misquotes this statute in its brief. It sets forth the 
factors included in the statute, but omits "the economic impact of the 
penalty on the business," from the quotation. See Appellee's Br. at 36. 
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court relied upon our holding in Public Interest Research 
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 
913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990) ("PIRG"), to begin with this 
maximum amount, and proceeded by determining whether 
any of the specified considerations in S 7413(e)(1) justified 
mitigation of that total. The court stated "[w]hen imposing 
a penalty, courts may start with the statutory maximum 
and then consider factors in mitigation of the maximum." 
D. Ct. Op. at 16 (citing PIRG). The court concluded that 
neither the elaborated factors, nor the interests of justice 
supported mitigating the fine. The court specifically refused 
to mitigate the fine based on Grant's bankruptcy. 
 
The Court will not mitigate the civil penalty based upon 
 
       Grant's filing for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy . . . There is 
       nothing to indicate that Grant cannot afford the 
       penalty other than Grant's conclusory statement that 
       he has lost all of his assets. Grant has not submitted 
       tax records or findings of the bankruptcy court 
       regarding his financial condition. Without such 
       financial records, the Court cannot accurately 
       determine that the fine would be too great. 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 19. 
 
Thereafter, Grant filed a motion to amend the judgment 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and included copious financial 
records with that motion. However, the district court, 
accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, 
denied that motion because the records had not been 
submitted previously, and nothing in the record suggested 
that the records had been unavailable when the court 
decided the summary judgment motion. The court stated, 
"[i]ndeed, defendants admit that the evidence was available, 
but claim that they did not submit it because they were not 
on notice that the Court would address both liability and 
penalty aspects of the case. The record belies this claim." 
App. at 2. Accordingly, we must address the district court's 
failure to reconsider the fine based upon the additional 
financial information.8 However, before addressing that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our standard of review for the district court's denial of the 
appellants' 
motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) is for 
an abuse of discretion because the underlying order was an assessment 
of monetary penalties. See B & W Properties, 38 F.3d at 368 (citation 
omitted). 
 
                                16 
 
 
issue, we will comment upon the process used by the 
district court to determine the appropriate amount of the 
fine. 
 
Courts usually calculate a fine under the CAA by starting 
with the maximum penalty. See, e.g., B & W Investment 
Properties, 38 F.3d at 368 ("[I]n considering fines under the 
Act, courts generally presume that the maximum penalty 
should be imposed."); Tyson Foods, Inc. 897 F.2d 1128, 
1141 ("Upon remand, the district court should first 
determine the maximum fine. . . . it must reduce the fine 
in accordance with the factors spelled out in [the statute].").9 
As noted above, the district court here relied upon our 
decision in PIRG to state: "courts may start with the 
statutory maximum and then consider factors in mitigation 
of the maximum." D. Ct. Op. at 16. However, although 
courts may, and frequently do, begin at the maximum, we 
have never suggested that such a procedure is always 
appropriate. Moreover, our research has not found any 
appellate decision that would suggest that method of 
determining a fine under the Clean Air Act is always the 
best way of proceeding. 
 
In PIRG, the district court assessed the maximum penalty 
allowed under the Act and then reduced that amount based 
upon some of the mitigating factors. We reversed based 
upon our conclusion that the district court erred in 
mitigating the fine because of the violator's good faith, and 
the regulatory agency's inaction. We reasoned that, 
although such a reduction may be appropriate when it is in 
the interests of justice, the record before the district court 
did not support a reduction for the particular violator's 
good faith nor the "nonfeasance" of the regulatory agency. 
Id. at 80-1. We did not suggest that courts should always 
begin a fine assessment at the maximum. There will be 
instances when doing so will initially set the bar so high 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Tyson Foods dealt with fines for violations of the Clean Water Act. 
However, the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act are in pari materia, 
United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 684 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1982) 
aff'd, 464 U.S. 165 (1984), and courts often rely upon interpretations of 
the Clean Water Act to assist with an analysis under the Clean Air Act. 
See, e.g., Midwest Suspension, 824 F. Supp. at 733. 
 
                                17 
 
 
that it will remain at a height that is inconsistent with the 
mitigating factors in S 7413(e)(1) even after it is lowered. 
Here, for example, the fine of nearly $3,000,000 bore no 
relationship to the violators' ability to pay. This is contrary 
to Congress' mandate that courts consider "the economic 
impact of the penalty on the business." 42 U.S.C. 
S 7413(e)(1). The fine that is imposed must have some 
reasonable, and proportionate "nexus" to the violations and 
the violators. See Midwest Suspension, 49 F.3d at 1204 
("Midwest's argument that the district court did not 
establish any nexus whatsoever between the violations 
claimed and the penalties assessed has no merit."). Such a 
nexus is implicit in Congress' command that courts include 
within their mitigation analysis "other factors as justice 
may require." 42 U.S.C. S 7413(e)(1). 
 
Courts can achieve an equitable mitigation (if any is 
warranted in a particular case) either by starting at the 
maximum penalty and mitigating it downward based upon 
the factors in S 7413(e)(1), or simply relying upon those 
factors to arrive at an appropriate amount without starting 
at the maximum. The statute only requires that thefine be 
consistent with a consideration of each of the factors the 
court is obligated to evaluate. 
 
Here, appellants' financial condition was relevant to a 
determination of the appropriate penalty, and the district 
court abused its discretion in refusing to consider it. The 
court justified its refusal for the reasons stated above, 
however, the court had a legal obligation to consider each 
of the factors set forth in the Act. As noted above, Congress 
stated that a court "shall take into consideration" each of 
the factors set forth in that Act. 42 U.S.C. S 7413(e)(1). 
Here, the court's refusal to consider Grant's bankruptcy is 
inconsistent with that mandate. Accordingly, the court 
abused its discretion in refusing to consider appellants' 
financial records. See Midwest Suspension, 824 F. Supp. at 
735 (rejecting government's request to adopt a rule of law 
requiring a violator to have "burden of presenting evidence 
to support a reduction from the statutory maximum 
penalty" or pay maximum amount). 
 
Dell'Aquilla settled with the government for $400,000. 
The evidence that the appellants attempted to introduce via 
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their Rule 59(e) motion could have (if accepted by the court) 
established their utter inability to pay the fine that was 
imposed. That fine was nearly 750% greater than the 
settlement the government accepted from Dell'Aquilla, the 
owner of the property.10 We do not mean to suggest that the 
district court was somehow limited by the government's 
settlement. It may well be that a court would be justified in 
imposing such a disparate fine because of the policy 
considerations that favor settlements as well as the 
particular circumstances in a given prosecution under the 
CAA. However, the district court should have considered 
appellants' financial records before concluding that such a 
disparity was consistent with its obligation to consider the 
mitigating factors set forth in the statute. Since the court 
failed to consider appellants' financial condition, we will 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. At those proceedings, the court will consider the 
financial records previously offered by appellants. Since the 
government may not be able to establish that the three 
visible emissions constituted violations or that Grant and 
Sandalwood are liable for all of the period from June 29, 
1988 to September 14, 1988, the resulting fine may be 
smaller than the one originally imposed regardless of how 
the court calculates the fine. However, any fine that is 
imposed must be consistent with the command of 42 




       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse 
in part, vacate the court's order as to the penalty, and 





10. In addition, to Grant's financial problems, including bankruptcy, 
there is evidence in the record that the economic benefit gained by Grant 
and Sandalwood was just $100,000 -- the amount expended to the 
cleanup cost of ACM on the Hoboken property. See Report and 
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge at 6. 
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